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Introduction
As A SENIOR SALES ASSOCIATE at a high-end jewelry store, Alicia
Jenkins consistently exceeded her sales quotas and earned high com-
missions. She had been working at the same store for more than seven
years, and in this time had built up a client base of faithful customers.
Alicia's clients trusted her taste and relied on her to set aside new
inventory for them, often asking her to choose styles that suited them
or to help select pieces for purchase.
One day, Alicia's supervisor informed her that the company was
instituting a new grooming and appearance policy. Female employees
were now required to wear their hair long, blonde, and clipped with a
jeweled barrette manufactured by the company. The policy also re-
quired that all male employees keep their hair above shoulder length.
Alicia's hair was short and naturally dark brown. She told her supervi-
sor that she didn't feel comfortable dyeing her hair and growing it out
long, since she preferred the ease of short hair and wanted to keep
her hair's natural color. Her supervisor informed her that the com-
pany was invested in presenting a uniform "look" for its sales force
and that management wanted its employees to reflect the company's
traditional feminine aesthetic. Unless Alicia agreed to comply with the
new policy, she would be fired. Unwilling to compromise, Alicia re-
fused to dye her hair blonde and was fired as a result.'
* Class of 2008, Comments Editor, USF Law Review. Special thanks to Professor
Michelle Travis for her invaluable encouragement, insight, and guidance. I would also like
to thank my editor, Cynthia Der, for all of her amazing work, and Marko Sotto, for his
patience, love, and support throughout.
1. Although this situation is a hypothetical one, it illustrates the problem faced by
employees who refuse to conform to employer dress and grooming codes.
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Can Alicia bring a claim against her former employer for illegal
sex discrimination? Does requiring female employees to conform to a
traditional feminine aesthetic constitute sex stereotyping? The answer
depends on what definition of sex stereotyping the court chooses to
apply.
In the past thirty years, popular understandings of gender roles
and gender discrimination have undergone a radical transformation.
The notion that gender may be socially rather than biologically con-
structed is increasingly accepted by scholars, legal theorists, and the
general public.2 As conceptions of gender and gender roles continue
to change, society is confronted with a growing number of people who
resist conforming to traditional gender norms.
In response to this ongoing transformation, courts have begun to
shift the ways in which they understand gender and sex discrimina-
tion. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") states that
employers may not discriminate "because of sex."3 Since 1964, how-
ever, judicial understandings of what constitutes discrimination "be-
cause of sex" have changed. 4 The pivotal case in this area is Price
2. See generally Julie A. Seaman, Form and (Dys)Function in Sexual Harassment Law: Biol-
ogy, Culture, and the Spandrels of Title VII, 37 AIz. ST. L.J. 321, 358 (2005) ("[1]n its starkest
form, the social constructionist understanding of gender difference posits that observed
differences do not have any objective or biological basis."); Valorie K. Vojdik, Gender Out-
laws: Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally Male Institutions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 68,
74 (2002) ("Gender is better conceptualized as an institution, a social process of exclusion
that distinguishes persons based on their sex .... Gender is a social practice that is pro-
duced not only at the level of individuals, but within institutions as well.").
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). The statute states that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or re-
fuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id
4. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000), for a discussion of how
courts' interpretations of Title VII's "because of sex" language have changed over the
years. The Schwenk court stated:
In the context of Title VII, federal courts (including this one) initially adopted
the approach that sex is distinct from gender, and, as a result, held that Title VII
barred discrimination based on the former but not on the latter.... The initial
judicial approach . . . has been overruled by the logic and language of Price
Waterhouse.... Thus, under Price Waterhouse, "sex" under Title VII encompasses
both sex-that is, the biological differences between men and women-and
gender.
Id. at 1201-02 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
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Waterhouse v. Hopkins,5 a 1989 case in which the Supreme Court held
that discrimination based on a plaintiffs failure to conform to tradi-
tional sex stereotypes is prohibited under Title VII. 6
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard a case en banc
involving a female bartender who was fired for refusing to wear a full
face of makeup to work.7 The case is Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating
Co., 8 and the court held that although male bartenders were not re-
quired to wear makeup to work, the plaintiff nevertheless had not suf-
fered sex-based discrimination under Title VII.9 In its ruling, the court
improperly held that the makeup policy at issue in Jespersen was not an
instance of sex stereotyping under the Supreme Court's articulation
of the rule in Price Waterhouse.1° The Ninth Circuit based this holding
on irrelevant factual distinctions between the two cases, and incor-
rectly read the Supreme Court's Price Waterhouse holding as only nar-
rowly applicable. By upholding a separate and less stringent sex-
stereotyping test for sex-differentiated grooming and appearance poli-
cies, the Ninth Circuit created a legal loophole that leaves employees
in typically female industries with weaker legal protection than women
working in typically male industries.
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit was mistaken in con-
cluding that Jespersen fell outside of the Supreme Court's rule on sex-
stereotyping discrimination under Title VII. Part I provides back-
ground information on Title VII, describes how sex-discrimination
claims are brought under the statute, and examines the development
of the sex-stereotyping claim under Title VII. Part II looks at the Jesper-
sen holding and argues that the court misconstrued the limits of the
Supreme Court's sex-stereotyping rule. Part III then argues that the
Jespersen holding was incorrect in two key ways. First, the Ninth Circuit
made incorrect factual distinctions between Jespersen and Price
5. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
6. Id. at 251. The Court held that:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assum-
ing or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for
"[iln forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."
Id. (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
7. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen Ill), 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1106.
10. Id. (holding that the district court's observation that "the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex stereotyp-
ing, did not apply to this case") (citations omitted); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
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Waterhouse. Second, the Ninth Circuit improperly limited the Price
Waterhouse holding to a particular set of factual circumstances. Part IV
analyzes the negative impact that the Jespersen precedent will have on
women in typically female industries, and argues that the holding cre-
ates a precedent under which women in typically female industries
have less protection against sex stereotyping than do women in typi-
cally male industries.
I. The Development of the Sex-Stereotyping Doctrine Under
Title VII
A. Bringing a Sex-Discrimination Claim
Title VII declares, "It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer.., to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin."11 In order to bring a sex-discrimination claim under Title VII, a
plaintiff may argue that an employment practice creates a disparate
impact on members of a protected group or that it constitutes dispa-
rate treatment of a protected group or group member. Disparate-im-
pact claims allege that though an employer's policies are facially
neutral, they negatively impact one group and not another.12 Dispa-
rate-treatment claims, on the other hand, allege that an employer is
intentionally treating certain employees less favorably than others be-
cause of characteristics protected by Title VII. 13
The statute provides one exception to each type of prohibited
discriminatory practice. In disparate-impact cases where employers
have policies that are facially neutral, but nevertheless impact a pro-
tected group differently, the policy or practice may be justified by ar-
guing that it is 'job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity." 14 In disparate-treatment cases where employ-
ers intentionally institute policies which treat members of a protected
group differently, such treatment may still be justified under the Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification ("BFOQ") defense.' 5 A BFOQ exists
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2000).
12. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 853 (9th Cir. 2000).
13. Id. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
14. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
15. Id. § 2000e-2(e). This Comment will address only the issue of sex stereotyping
since previous commentators have already analyzed other aspects of sex discrimination as
it relates to Jespersen. For a discussion of the unequal burdens test and other problems
[Vol. 42
ENFORCING FEMININITY
in circumstances where discrimination against members of a particu-
lar religion, sex, or national origin group is "reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 16
Courts have agreed that employers may refuse to hire men, for in-
stance, in 'jobs where sex or vicarious sexual recreation is the primary
service provided, e.g. a social escort or topless dancer."17 The BFOQ
defense also applies in situations where employees are personal care-
takers, such as nurses and hospital staff whose jobs include bathing
patients and assisting them in using the restroom.18 In occupations
that require less intimate contact, such as flight attendant and other
service professions, courts have uniformly held that mere customer
preference for one sex over another is not sufficient to create a BFOQ
under Title VII. 19
In Jespersen, the plaintiff alleged only that her employer intention-
ally discriminated against her, not that the policy unintentionally im-
pacted women more than men. The focus of this Comment,
therefore, is on how to prove a claim of disparate treatment under
Title VII.
B. Defining Intent
There is little legislative history to guide courts in deciphering
Congress's intent in passing the sex discrimination provisions of Title
VII. This is because the addition of "sex" as a basis for discrimination
was added at the last minute without prior hearings or congressional
debate. 20 In fact, the term "sex" was added as an amendment to the
statute by Virginia Representative Howard Smith in the hopes that the
raised byJespersen, see Megan Kelly, Note, Making-Up Conditions of Employment: The Unequal
Burdens Test as a Flawed Mode of Analysis inJespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 36 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REv. 45 (2006). See also William M. Miller, Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the
Ninth Circuit's Unequal Burdens Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated Grooming Standards
Under Title VII, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1357 (2005).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
17. Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
18. See Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996); Jen-
nings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 376, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933, 935 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
19. Levin v. Delta Airlines, 730 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1984); Carroll v. Talman Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1029 (7th Cir. 1979); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442
F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
20. See Nicole Anzuoni, Gender Non-Conformists Under Title VII: A Confusing Jurisprudence
in Need of a Legislative Remedy, 3 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 871, 880-81 (2002).
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entire bill would fail.2 ' The last-minute passage of Title VII has thus
left courts without sufficient guidance in determining how the legisla-
ture meant the phrase "because of sex" to be construed.
Before Price Waterhouse, courts tended to understand Title VII as
providing narrow protection against sex discrimination. 22 That is,
most courts held that "the phrase in Title VII prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on sex, in its plain meaning, implies that it is unlawful to
discriminate against women because they are women and against men
because they are men."23 Discrimination because of gender noncon-
formity, including homosexuality, was considered outside of the pur-
view of Title VII. 24
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court ruled that an accounting
firm's refusal to promote a female accountant to partner because she
failed to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry" 25
was sex stereotyping and constituted prima facie evidence of a viola-
tion of Title VII.2 6 The Price Waterhouse holding transformed Title VII
jurisprudence 27 by unequivocally stating that employers could not dis-
criminate against an employee because she did not conform to tradi-
tional sex stereotypes. 28 In holding that sexual stereotyping fell within
the statutory definition of sex discrimination, the Supreme Court ex-
21. Id.; see also Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting
that the "sex amendment was the gambit of a congressman seeking to scuttle adoption of
the Civil Rights Act").
22. See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977) (holding that sex
discrimination occurs where an employment policy "deprive[s] ... [women] of employ-
ment opportunities because of their different role"); deLaurier v. S.D. Unified Sch. Dist.,
588 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[S]ex discrimination results when the opportunities or
benefits offered by the employer to one gender are less valuable or more restricted than
those offered to the other.").
23. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
24. Id.; see also Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979); De Santis v. Pac.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp.
1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
25. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
26. Id. at 251.
27. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he approach in
Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane-and by the district court in this case-has been eviscerated
by Price Waterhouse. ); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001)
("Price Waterhouse sets a rule that bars discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes.");
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The initial judicial approach
taken in cases such as Holloway has been overruled by the logic and language of Price
Waterhouse."); see also STEVEN C. KAHN & BARBARA BERISH BROWN, LEGAL GUIDE TO HUMAN
RESOURCES § 7:23 (2006) (referring to Price Waterhouse as "[t]he key decision" in the area of
sex stereotyping and women's role in the workplace).
28. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
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panded the term "sex" to include the notion of gender.29 The Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse thus brought Title VII jurisprudence into
accord with modern notions of what constitutes sex discrimination.
Current understandings of Title VII protection against sex stere-
otyping have been shaped largely by Price Waterhouse.30 The Supreme
Court used the legislative ambiguity around the meaning of Title VII
as a means to open the door to a broader reading. The Court's hold-
ing has potentially far-reaching effects since it recognizes that Title VII
protects not only against discrimination based on one's biological sex,
but also against discrimination based on one's degree of conformance
to sex stereotypes or traditional gender roles.
Other federal courts have similarly held that the lack of clear leg-
islative intent signals that courts should read protection against dis-
crimination on the basis of gender non-conformity into the statute.31
The Seventh Circuit Court stated: "[Because] the legislative history
suggests that legislators had very little preconceived notion of what
type of sex discrimination they were dealing with when they enacted
Title VII[,] . .. [i] t is, ultimately, the plain, unambiguous language of
the statute upon which we must focus." 32 Furthermore, "Title VII does
not permit an employee to be treated adversely because his or her
appearance or conduct does not conform to stereotypical gender
roles."33
This shift towards a broader reading of Title VII indicates that
courts are starting to transform their understanding of what consti-
tutes sex discrimination. Sex discrimination, once understood as nega-
tive treatment based on pure biological difference, is now read as
incorporating discrimination based on gender and gender non-con-
29. While "sex" is usually understood in a biological sense, gender refers to the so-
cially-constructed means by which sex is experienced and performed. See Vojdik, supra note
2. Sex stereotyping is a facet of gender discrimination because it requires a person to con-
form to particular notions of how gender should be performed. Rather than being passed
over for promotion simply because she was a woman, Ann Hopkins was passed over for
promotion because she failed to present herself in a manner that conformed to traditional
notions of how a woman should appear. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 255-59.
30. See, e.g., Ellen M. Martin et al., Evolving Theories of Sex, Race, and Color Discrimination
Under Title VII, 763 P.L.I. LIT. 153, 159 (2007) ("P-ice Waterhouse extended 'sex' to include
Igender' which refers to 'socially-constructed norms associated with a person's sex.'");
Michael Starr & Amy L. Strauss, Sex Stereotyping in Employment: Can the Center Hold?, 21 LAB.
LAW. 213, 213 (2006) ("Courts and commentators have concluded from the Price
Waterhouse plurality that gender stereotyping is, in and of itself, a form of sex discrimina-
tion actionable under Title VII."); see also KAHN & BROWN, supra note 27.
31. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1997).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 580.
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formity.3 4 By incorporating protection against discrimination based
on gender, and not a purely biological definition of sex, into Title VII,
the Supreme Court recognized that sex discrimination operates in
complex ways, 35 and is not simply discrimination against "women be-
cause they are women and men because they are men."36
II. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Company
The Price Waterhouse holding created a remedy under Title VII for
employees who had not suffered sexual harassment or negative em-
ployment consequences solely and directly on the basis of their sex,
but who nevertheless had been the subject of intentional sex discrimi-
nation. A recent ruling by the Ninth Circuit, however, challenges the
broad protections against sex stereotyping that Price Waterhouse offers.
In Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
Price Waterhouse sex-stereotyping rule in a new and narrow way,37 and
as a result, left women in typically female jobs with decreased protec-
tion against sex discrimination.
A. Factual Background
Darlene Jespersen was a bartender at Harrah's Casino for nearly
twenty years. 38 Until she was fired, Jespersen was an outstanding em-
ployee and regularly received praise from both her supervisors and
customers.3 9 In February of 2000, Harrah's implemented a "Beverage
Department Image Transformation" program at select casinos, includ-
ing the one where Jespersen worked. 40 Part of the new policy was a
"Personal Best" appearance standard, which required women to have
"teased, curled, or styled [hair] every day. ' 41 Furthermore, "[h]air...
34. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 ("As for the legal relevance of sex stere-
otyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming
or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group."); Nichols v. Az-
teca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Price Waterhouse sets a rule that
bars discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes."); City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at 580.
35. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 ("In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.").
36. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
37. See infra Part III.
38. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen I1), 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir.
2004) (en banc), affd byJespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen II1), 444 F.3d 1104
(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Jespersen IIl, 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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[was to] be worn down at all times, [with] no exceptions." 42 Women
also had to wear stockings, nail polish, and "face powder, blush and
mascara.., worn and applied neatly in complimentary [sic] colors." 43
Lip color was also required "at all times."44 Men, on the other hand,
had to refrain from wearing hair that fell below the top of their col-
lars, were required to keep their nails trimmed, and were not permit-
ted to wear makeup or nail polish.
45
As part of the new appearance and grooming policy, the casino
hired "Personal Best Image Facilitators" to instruct Harrah's employ-
ees on how to meet the new appearance requirements. 46 These Image
Facilitators were also instructed to test employees on their ability to
recreate their new "look."'47 Harrah's then took two photos (one a full
body photo, the other a head shot) of each employee looking his or
her "Personal Best," and filed these photos with each employee's su-
pervisor. 48 The supervisors were to use the photos as an "appearance
measurement" tool and to hold each employee accountable to look-
ing his or her personal best, as measured against the photographs. 49
Jespersen had tried wearing makeup to work in the past, since she
knew that Harrah's preferred its female bar employees to do so.
50
When she wore makeup, however, Jespersen said she felt "sick, de-
graded, exposed, and violated."5 1 She explained that she felt that
wearing makeup sexually objectified her by forcing her into a tradi-
tionally feminine mold.52 She also felt that it interfered with her abil-
ity to do her job effectively, since she sometimes had to manage
drunken, rowdy guests who would not take her seriously when she was
wearing makeup.53 For these reasons, Jespersen refused to comply
with the new appearance policy's makeup requirement.54 As a result,
Harrah's fired her.5 5
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at 1077 & n.1.
46. Id. at 1078.
47. Id,
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1077.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1078.
55. Id.
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B. The Unequal Burdens Test and Sex Stereotyping
In appearance and grooming cases, there are two ways in which a
plaintiff may prove an employer's intent to discriminate on the basis
of sex.56 The first method is to prove that the grooming or appear-
ance policy imposes objectively unequal burdens on men and wo-
men.5 7 This is generally referred to as the "unequal burdens test." The
second method, from Jespersen, requires a showing that the grooming
or appearance policy is motivated or shaped by sex stereotyping.58 In
arguing her case, Jespersen used both theories to demonstrate that
she had been the victim of intentional sex discrimination.
Jespersen first claimed that the casino's Personal Best grooming
and appearance policy imposed unequal burdens on men and wo-
men. 59 Jespersen lost on her first claim because the Ninth Circuit
found that she failed to present evidence, apart from "her own subjec-
tive reaction," 60 that the makeup policy imposed unequal burdens on
men and women. 61
The unequal burdens test presents a significant hurdle because
plaintiffs must present evidence that the policy in question places an
objectively heavier burden on women than on men. 62 In practice, a
court's decision as to whether or not a policy imposes unequal bur-
dens on men and women is largely determined by its own subjective
understanding of what constitutes a "burden."63 In the Jespersen case,
56. See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 853 (9th Cir. 2000); Gerdom v.
Cont'l Airlines, 692 F.2d 602, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1982).
57. Jespersen III, 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006). The unequal burdens test exam-
ines whether an employer's grooming and appearance code "regulates mutable character-
istics of one gender in a stricter way than those of the other gender." Miller, supra note 15,
at 1359. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that an airline regulation that imposed
stricter weight requirements on female flight attendants than on male flight attendants was
an unequal burden. Frank, 216 F.3d at 854-55.
58. Jespersen III, 444 F.3d at 1106.
59. Id. at 1108-09.
60. Id. at 1108.
61. Id. For a more in-depth analysis of the court's rejection of Jespersen's unequal
burdens claim, see Dianne Avery, The Great American Makeover: The Sexing Up and Dumbing
Down of Women's Work AflerJespersen v. Harrah's Operating Company, Inc., 42 U.S.F. L.
REv. 299 (2008).
62. Jespersen III, 444 F.3d at 1110. The Jespersen court held that "[u]nder established
equal burdens analysis, when an employer's grooming and appearance policy does not
unreasonably burden one gender more than the other, that policy will not violate Tide
VII." Id.
63. See Jespersen II, 392 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), affd byJespersen v.
Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen II1), 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), for the
Ninth Circuit's discussion (in Jespersen's first appeal) of how to evaluate the unequal bur-
dens test.
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the court understood this burden to include only tangible things,
such as the cost of buying makeup, and the time spent applying it.64
Jespersen's second claim was that the policy constituted sex stere-
otyping under the Supreme Court's Price Waterhouse holding. 65 In de-
termining that the casino's grooming and appearance policy did not
constitute sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse, the court drew
three distinctions between the two cases. First, the court pointed out
that the sex stereotyping in Price Waterhouse actually impaired the
plaintiffs ability to perform her job successfully, while wearing
makeup did not impede Jespersen in performing her job as a bar-
tender.66 Second, the court noted that Jespersen was subject to the
same uniform and grooming requirements as all of the other casino
employees, while the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse was held to a stan-
dard which did not necessarily apply to her co-workers. 67 Finally, the
court observed that in Price Waterhouse the plaintiff was singled out by
her employer, while Jespersen was treated in the same manner that
any other employee refusing to comply with the grooming policy
would have been.68 All together, the court decided that these three
distinctions were enough to conclude thatJespersen's claim was "lim-
ited to the subjective reaction of a single employee, and there [was]
no evidence of a stereotypical motivation on the part of the
employer."69
IM. How the Jespersen Court Got It Wrong: The Sex-
Stereotyping Holding
The Jespersen holding incorrectly and unnecessarily narrowed the
Price Waterhouse sex-stereotyping rule in several ways. First, the court
factually distinguished Jespersen from Price Waterhouse, and in doing so,
constructed a false framework for analyzing whether sex stereotyping
existed. Second, the court limited the Price Waterhouse sex-stereotyping
rule to particular circumstances rather than applying it broadly, as
other courts have done. Third, the court's holding created a two-tier
system of protection which leaves women in typically female jobs more
vulnerable to sex stereotyping.
64. The unequal burdens issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. For references
to other pieces analyzing this issue, please see supra note 15.
65. Jespersen II, 444 F.3d at 1112.
66. Id. at 1111.
67. Id. at 1111-12.
68. Id. at 1113.
69. Id.
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A. The Factual Distinctions Between Jespersen and Price Waterhouse
Are Insufficient to Support a Finding of No Sex
Discrimination in Jespersen
The Ninth Circuit concluded that because there were three im-
portant factual distinctions between the Price Waterhouse and Jespersen
cases, Harrah's Personal Best appearance policy was not "adopted to
make women bartenders conform to a commonly-accepted stereotypi-
cal image of what women should wear '70 in contravention of the Price
Waterhouse rule. 71 Upon closer inspection, however, these factual dis-
tinctions prove irrelevant to the real issues at play in the Jespersen and
Price Waterhouse cases.
1. The Makeup Requirement as an Impediment to Success at
Work
One of the primary arguments that the Ninth Circuit used in dis-
tinguishing Jespersen from Price Waterhouse was that the alleged sex ster-
eotyping in Jespersen did not put the plaintiff into "an intolerable and
impermissible catch-22,"'72 in the way that sex stereotyping in Price
Waterhouse did.73 According to the Supreme Court, Price Waterhouse
engaged in illegal sex discrimination when it employed Hopkins in a
position which required aggressiveness, but then refused to promote
her because she demonstrated this very trait.74 According to the Ninth
Circuit, this type of catch-22, which confirms the existence of sex dis-
crimination, was not present in Jespersen's case. 75
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Ninth Circuit gave no
weight to Jespersen's own testimony about the effect of the makeup
requirement on her ability to perform successfully at work. According
to Jespersen, the makeup requirement "took away [her] credibility as
an individual and as a person" and made it difficult for her to deal
with unruly guests at the bar. 76 Furthermore, she felt "sick, degraded,
70. Id. at 1112.
71. Id. at 1113.
72. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
73. Jespersen III, 444 F.3d at 1111-12.
74. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
75. Jespersen III, 444 F.3d at 1111-12 ("Impermissible sex stereotyping was clear [in the
Prce Waterhouse case] because the very traits that... [the plaintiff] was asked to hide were
the same traits considered praiseworthy in men. Harrah's 'Personal Best' policy is very
different.").
76. Jespersen II, 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), affdJespersen v. Har-
rah's Operating Co. (espersen 111), 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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exposed, and violated" when she had to wear makeup to work. 77 The
failure of the court to concede the importance of these facts demon-
strates both a lack of understanding of what is required for a bar-
tender to perform successfully at work and a failure to recognize that
the makeup policy did in fact place Jespersen in an intolerable catch-
22.
A bartender's social skills and self-presentation are crucial to his
or her success. 78 The ability to socialize comfortably with customers,
make them feel at home, and develop genuine and friendly relation-
ships are all crucial to attracting repeat customers and earning tips.
79
A bartender must also be able to effectively handle drunken, rowdy, or
hostile customers without losing composure, creating a scene, or un-
necessarily disturbing other guests. In order to do this, a bartender
must be authoritative and confident. While being a good bartender
certainly requires a degree of skill in pouring, mixing, and serving
drinks, true success depends more on social skill than on practical
skill.8 0
Jespersen's testimony that she felt uncomfortable, degraded, and
no longer credible when wearing makeup clearly shows that she was
unable to relate to guests at the bar while wearing makeup in the same
way that she could when barefaced. Her success as a bartender de-
pended in large part on her comfortable, confident, and authoritative
interactions with customers. When she was forced to wear makeup,
she lost this crucial piece of her job performance. 81
In Jespersen, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[i]mpermissible sex
stereotyping was clear [in Price Waterhouse] because the very traits that
[plaintiff Ann Hopkins] was asked to hide were the same traits consid-
ered praiseworthy in men."8 2 Yet in Jespersen's case, the same dy-
namic existed. Jespersen was asked to wear makeup, which made it
77. Id.
78. See Gary Regan, Service Skills on the Rocks: A Bad Attitude Behind the Bar Can Ruin
What's in the Glass, 40 NATION'S REST. NEWS, Apr. 17, 2006, at 28. "Being able to serve good
drinks is obviously one important aspect of the bartender's job, but having a good rapport
with customers is surely every bit as important as being blessed with good mixology skills.
Perhaps it's even more important." Id.
79. See id.; see also Vicky Elmer, Behind the Bar They Learn How to Mix; Skills with People
Determine These Workers' Success, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2007, at K1. "Bartenders need strong
people skills, including an ability to converse easily with both men and women." Id.
80. See supra notes 78-79.
81. Jespersen 111, 444 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) ("Jespersen testified
that'... [the makeup policy] prohibited [her] from doing [her] job' because '[i] t affected
[her] self-dignity ... [and] took away [her] credibility as an individual and as a person.'").
82. Id. at 1111.
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impossible for her to present the persona which made her a successful
bartender.8 3 When she refused to wear makeup so that she could con-
tinue to do herjob well, she was told that she could no longer work as
a bartender at Harrah's. The same paradox was at play in both Price
Waterhouse and Jespersen.
Furthermore, in its Jespersen opinion, the Ninth Circuit created an
unspoken gender-based distinction between the two cases. In Price
Waterhouse, the plaintiff worked in accounting, a traditionally male in-
dustry.8 4 Because financial management has traditionally been a male-
dominated industry, the court implicitly assumed that forcing Hop-
kins to present a stereotypically-feminine manner would put her at a
disadvantage. 85 In Jespersen, however, where the plaintiff was working
in the service and hospitality industry, which has traditionally em-
ployed female workers,86 the court jumped to the opposite assump-
tion, concluding that being forced to don a stereotypically-feminine
face would not putJespersen at a disadvantage.87 By making this incor-
rect assumption, the court created a rule which automatically disad-
vantages women in typically female jobs when they bring Title VII sex-
stereotyping claims.
2. The Ninth Circuit's False Framework: Across-the-Board
Grooming and Appearance Requirements and the
Equality of Treatment Accorded to Jespersen
The second and third factual distinctions which the Ninth Circuit
drew between the two cases can be collapsed into one argument. The
court concluded that unlike Hopkins, Jespersen was subject to the
same grooming and appearance policy as all of the other casino em-
ployees-she was not singled out by her employer or subjected to a
83. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
84. For more on historically gender-segregated occupations, see infra notes 134-36.
85. Jespersen 111, 444 F.3d at 1111 ("[It was] impermissible for Hopkins's employer to
place her in an untenable Catch-22: she needed to be aggressive and masculine to excel at
her job, but was denied partnership for doing so because of her employer's gender
stereotype.").
86. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 20 Leading Occupations of
Employed Women 2006 Annual Averages, http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/
201ead2006.htm (last visitedJan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Labor] (showing that
as of 2006, 71.5% of waiters and waitresses are female).
87. Jespersen III, 444 F.3d. at 1112 ("The record contains nothing to suggest the
grooming standards would objectively inhibit a woman's ability to do the job. The only
evidence in the record to support the stereotyping claim isJespersen's own subjective reac-
tion to the makeup requirement.").
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unique punishment for failing to conform to the policy.88 According
to the Ninth Circuit, Hopkins, unlike Jespersen, had been singled out
for special discriminatory treatment.8 9 The court's conclusion is based
on a false framework, as the two cases are in fact quite similar. The
real difference lies not in whether Jespersen was singled out, but in
whether the employer imposed sex stereotyping via formal policy or
informal censure. In Price Waterhouse, there was no written policy that
the defendants could point to in arguing that everyone was subject to
the same requirements, 90 whereas in Jespersen, a written policy did ex-
ist.9 1 In practice, however, whether the policy was written or unwrit-
ten, both employers imposed requirements rooted in sex stereotypes
on their employees, and both Jespersen and Hopkins were punished
for failing to meet these requirements.
In Hopkins's case, there was no written policy requiring female
associates to behave in a stereotypically-feminine manner. The com-
pany's requirement was enforced through other means, such as refus-
ing to hire or promote women who failed to meet the firm's gendered
expectations. 92 The Ninth Circuit implied that this policy singled
Hopkins out by subjecting her to different standards than those ap-
plied to other employees.9 3 The fact that no other woman at Price
Waterhouse actually brought a suit against the company, however,
does not mean that there were no other women who refused to con-
form to the firm's stereotypical gender expectations and, as a result,
were subject to censure, discrimination, or negative employment deci-
sions. In fact, the Price Waterhouse opinion itself states that "other fe-
male candidates for partnership also had been evaluated in sex-based
terms. As a general matter,... '[ciandidates were viewed favorably if
88. Id. at 1111-12.
89. Id.
90. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234-36 (1989), for a description of
how Hopkins's employers treated her differently than her co-workers when considering
her bid for partnership.
91. Jespersen III, 444 F.3d at 1107.
92. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 236. In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff successfully
argued that she was denied partnership because she was not as stereotypically feminine as
her employers wanted her to be. Id. at 251 ("Hopkins proved that Price Waterhouse invited
partners to submit comments [on her candidacy for partnership]; that some of the com-
ments stemmed from sex stereotypes; that an important part of the Policy Board's decision
on Hopkins was an assessment of the submitted comments; and that Price Waterhouse in
no way disclaimed reliance on the sex-linked evaluations.").
93. Jespersen Il, 444 F.3d at 1111-12.
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partners believed they maintained their femin [in] ity while becoming
effective professional managers' . . . ."94
The Ninth Circuit's attempt to distinguish Price Waterhouse, how-
ever, rests on the assumption that Hopkins was especially singled out,
that she was the only one amongst many gender non-conforming wo-
men who was actually subject to stereotyped expectations or punished
for failing to be feminine enough. In reality, it is much more likely
that the firm's unspoken rule requiring women to behave in a femi-
nine manner applied across the board to all female employees, and
that the employer would have punished equally all female employees
breaking the rule.
In Jespersen's case, the policy was formal and memorialized in
writing.9 5 When Jespersen violated the policy, she was fired. Likewise,
when Hopkins violated her firm's unwritten policy, she was denied
promotion to partner.9 6 The only difference between the two cases
was that one company put its gender requirements into writing, and
the other did not. This distinction between a written code (which
clearly applies to all employees) and an unwritten code (which will
also usually apply to all employees) is irrelevant in determining
whether an employer has subjected employees to sex stereotyping. In
basing its decision on the notion that Hopkins was singled out by
Price Waterhouse's discriminatory policy,9 7 the Jespersen court relies
on a false premise to support its reasoning.
B. Price Waterhouse Does Not Limit Sex Stereotyping to a
Particular Type of Fact Pattern
While some factual distinctions may accurately be drawn between
the two cases, there is no logical reason to conclude that simply be-
cause the facts in the two cases are different, no sex stereotyping oc-
curred in Jespersen. The only meaningful distinction between the two
cases was that the written policy in Jespersen applied to both men and
women, while the unwritten policy in Price Waterhouse (presumably)
applied only to women.98 This factual distinction is irrelevant in deter-
94. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 236 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F.
Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
95. Jespersen Ill, 444 F.3d at 1107.
96. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233 n.1.
97. Jespersen Il1, 444 F.3d at 1111-12.
98. See id. at 1107. Harrah's Personal Best policy stated that "[olverall Guidelines
[are] (applied equally to male/female)" employees. Id.; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
236 ("In previous years, other female candidates for partnership also had been evaluated in
sex-based terms." (emphasis added)).
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mining whether the employer engaged in sex stereotyping. The Price
Waterhouse Court held that "we are beyond the day when an employer
could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched
the stereotype associated with their group."99 In making this state-
ment, the Supreme Court left the door open as to what sorts of facts
may give rise to sex-stereotyping claims. There was no indication that
the Court meant to require that a laundry list of factors be met before
conceding that sex stereotyping has occurred.
1. Sex Stereotyping Occurs Even Where Men and Women Are
Equally Subject to Stereotypes
While it is undoubtedly true that employers should be able to
impose certain types of appearance standards on their employees in
order to create a professional and appropriate image for the com-
pany, such standards should not be permitted to perpetuate outdated
sexual stereotypes simply because they require both men and women
to meet some sort of grooming or appearance requirement. Even
where employer-mandated appearance requirements do impose simi-
larly on men and women, such standards should not slip past legal
scrutiny simply because they place equally stereotypical requirements
on members of both sexes.
Not all sex-differentiated appearance and grooming codes are in-
herently based on sex stereotypes. The mere fact that such a code
imposes requirements on both men and women, however, does not
mean that the policy is not based on sex stereotypes. Yet courts have
generally held that as long as the grooming and appearance policy is
"reasonable," it does not violate Title VII.100 The problem is, however,
that judges have too much freedom to impose their own prejudices
and preconceptions in defining what constitutes a "reasonable" gen-
der-specific policy.'01 In other words, the current rule on employer
grooming standards provides that it is legal for:
99. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
100. Jespersen Ill, 444 F.3d at 1113 ("[I]n commenting on grooming standards, the
touch-stone is reasonableness."); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 n.7
(9th Cir. 2001) ("[O]ur decision does not imply that there is any violation of Title VII
occasioned by reasonable regulations that require male and female employees to conform
to different dress and grooming standards.").
101. An excellent example of this is Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir.
1985), in which a female news anchor was told to wear:
blouses with "feminine touches," such as bows and ruffles, because many of her
clothes were "too masculine." The general wardrobe hints for females developed
by Media Associates warned that women with "soft" hairstyles and looks should
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dress codes [to] distinguish between men and women on the basis
of "commonly accepted social norms" or "generally accepted com-
munity standards of dress and appearance." . . . Thus, as the law
stands, an employer may hold women to different standards from
men, as long as it. . . "merely" enforces prevailing prejudice. 10 2
This Title VII loophole for grooming and appearance standards
imposed on both men and women is particularly egregious given that
expectations around grooming and appearance are intimately con-
nected to, and highly dependent upon, sexual stereotypes. Women in
particular have traditionally been rigorously constrained in the ways in
which they are expected to present themselves physically. 10 3 In fact,
women's social capital-the degree of desirability and power that wo-
men hold in the social and economic spheres-has always been
closely tied to physical appearance.
10 4
This same principle holds true within the realm of business and
employment. In one study, more than 650 managers were asked to
rank a number of factors which help people succeed within organiza-
tions. 10 5 Out of twenty factors, personal appearance was ranked num-
ber eight.1 0 6 As one article points out:
wear blazers to establish their authority and credibility while women with short
"masculine" hairstyles shouldn't wear "masculine" clothing in dark colors and
with strong lines because they would appear too "aggressive."
Id. at 1214. The court held that "[w]hile there may have been some emphasis on the
feminine stereotype of 'softness' and bows and ruffles and on the fashionableness of fe-
male anchors," such an emphasis was "reasonable" and therefore the policy was not shaped
by "any stereotypical notions of female roles and images." Id. at 1215-16 & n.12.
102. Karl E. Kare, For Mary Joe Frug: A Symposium on Feminist Critical Legal Studies and
Postmodernism, Part Two: The Politics of Gender Identity: Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee
Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. Rv. 1395, 1417-18 (1992) (quoting Carroll v. Talman Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1979) and Willingham v. Macon
Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975)).
103. Id. at 1421 ("[It is] obvious that the burdens of societal appearance expectations
fall most heavily on women. In the world of employment, women are routinely and reflex-
ively evaluated and stringently judged on the basis of their appearance and dress, regard-
less of other, legitimately job-related qualifications. Employers in every type of industry will
prefer and advance women who are more 'attractive' and disadvantage 'unattractive' wo-
men. This phenomenon is pervasive in American life.").
104. See, e.g., Margaret L. Hunter, If You're Light You're Alright: Light Skin Color as Social
Capital for Women of Color, 16 GENDER & Soc'y 175, 177 (2002) ("[Bleauty operates as social
capital for women. Women who possess this form of capital (beauty) are able to convert it
into economic capital, educational capital, or another form of social capital.... I define
,social capital' as a form of prestige related to things such as social status, reputation, and
social networks.").
105. See Nick Nykodym & Jack L. Simonetti, Personal Appearance: Is Attractiveness a Factor
in Organizational Survival or Success?, 24J. EMP. COUNSELING 69, 74-75 (1987).
106. Id.
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Attractive women can gain an advantage from the earliest stages of
employment through the later ones. For instance, when photo-
graphs are attached to resumes, research indicates that attractive
women will be favored over unattractive women. These results are
consistent even when the attractive women are rated as less compe-
tent in terms of experience and education. Studies have shown that
managers are likely to recommend higher starting salaries for
more attractive people. Attractive women are evaluated higher
than unattractive women in terms of task performance. When mak-
ing decisions about promotions, attractive persons in general even
tend to be favored over people with a better work record.10 7
Other research also indicates that women who are considered at-
tractive earn more than their less attractive counterparts.10 8 The fact
that a woman's social capital is often closely tied to her perceived at-
tractiveness demonstrates that appearance and grooming standards
should be examined within the larger context of sex stereotyping. Ex-
empting grooming and appearance standards which apply to both
men and women from the more general sex-stereotyping test articu-
lated in Price Waterhouse makes little sense when viewed within the con-
text of gendered appearance standards.
In Jespersen, both men and women were required to follow a
grooming and appearance code which relied heavily on traditional
notions of femininity and masculinity. As discussed above, the policy
required that female employees wear face powder, blush, mascara,
and lip color at all times,10 9 and keep their hair "teased, curled, or
styled" and "worn down at all times."' 110 Men, on the other hand, were
not allowed to wear makeup or nail polish, and had to keep their hair
above their collars.' These appearance requirements are clearly
based on traditional notions of how women and men should present
themselves in order to comport with gendered expectations. The fact
that the policy subjected both men and women to gendered appear-
ance regulation did not mitigate the stereotyped nature of the
regulation.
107. M. Neil Brown & Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Many Paths to Justice: The Glass Ceiling,
the Looking Glass, and Strategies for Getting to the Other Side, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. LJ. 61,
92-94 (2003).
108. Id. at 94.
109. Jespersen IIl, 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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2. Sex Stereotyping Occurs Where Employees Are Punished for
Their Gender Non-Conformity
Other courts have interpreted Price Waterhouse as prohibiting em-
ployment discrimination based on a person's failure to conform to
traditional gender stereotypes. 112 Unlike the Ninth Circuit inJespersen,
these courts have not read the Price Waterhouse rule as limited to the
particular type of fact pattern presented in the Price Waterhouse case.
Instead, they have extended the rule to cases where employees are
punished for failing to conform to traditional gender stereotypes and
norms.
According to contemporary sociological theory, gender is the so-
cially-constructed manner in which we act out biological sex." t3 "Gen-
der is not a natural occurrence resulting from biology, but a socially
constructed phenomenon. Gender is an institution, a social structure
that is reinforced by a set of practices."' 14 People who fail to conform
to the gender norms assigned to their biological sex are often the vic-
tims of discrimination, both in the workplace and outside of it.115 For
instance, a man who speaks softly, uses feminine mannerisms, and
wears only soft pastel colors would generally be considered insuffi-
ciently masculine, and may become the victim of homophobic com-
ments and behavior. A woman (like Darlene Jespersen) who refuses to
wear makeup or style her hair might be considered similarly un-
112. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that
because the male plaintiff "alleged that his failure to conform to sex stereotypes concern-
ing how a man should look and behave was the driving force behind Defendants' actions"
he had "sufficiently pleaded claims of sex stereotyping" according to the Price Waterhouse
precedent); Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001)
("There are at least three ways by which a plaintiff alleging same-sex sexual harassment
might demonstrate that the harassment amounted to discrimination because of sex-the
harasser was motivated by sexual desire, the harasser was expressing a general hostility to
the presence of one sex in the workplace, or the harasser was acting to punish the victim's
noncompliance with gender stereotypes."); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194
F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Just as a woman can ground an action on a claim that
men discriminated against her because she did not meet stereotyped expectations of femi-
ninity, a man can ground a claim on evidence that other men discriminated against him
because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity." (citations omitted));
Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The Supreme Court's decision
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins makes clear that Title VII does not permit an employee to be
treated adversely because his or her appearance or conduct does not conform to stere-
otypical gender roles." (citations omitted)).
113. See Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. Rxv. 359, 369 (2004).
114. Id.
115. See supra note 112 for a list of cases involving workplace discrimination based on
gender non-conformity.
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feminine and subject to workplace retaliation for her refusal to con-
form to gender norms.
In Smith v. City of Salem,"t6 the plaintiff alleged that he had been
discriminated against because his behavior at work did not conform to
traditional gender expectations.' 1 7 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed, stating that "[a] fter Price Waterhouse, an employer who discrim-
inates against women because, for instance, they do not wear dresses
or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the discrimina-
tion would not occur but for the victim's sex."118 A year later, the
Sixth Circuit confirmed this approach in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,'19
holding in favor of a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual police
officer who was demoted because of her failure to conform to tradi-
tional gender stereotypes. 120 According to the court, "Barnes estab-
lished that he was a member of a protected class [under Title VII] by
alleging discrimination against the City for his failure to conform to
sex stereotypes."'121
In Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 1 2 2 the plaintiff was a
gay man who brought a hostile-work-environment claim. 123 He alleged
that he was harassed by his peers and supervisors because he was ho-
mosexual.' 2 4 The court ruled that discrimination based on homosexu-
ality is not protected under Title VII,' 25 but in doing so pointed out
that discrimination based on sex stereotyping is indeed a violation of
the statute. 126 The court noted that the plaintiff could have brought a
more successful Title VII claim by alleging that the harassment consti-
tuted "discrimination because of sex by presenting evidence that the
116. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
117. Id. at 571. In Smith, the plaintiff was born a man, but was diagnosed with gender
identity disorder ("GID"). Id. at 568. As a result he began "expressing a more feminine
appearance on a full-time basis-including at work-in accordance with international
medical protocols for treating GID. Soon thereafter, Smith's co-workers began questioning
him about his appearance and commenting that his appearance and mannerisms were not
masculine enough." Id (internal quotations omitted).
118. Id. at 574.
119. 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).
120. Id. at 738.
121. Id. at 737.
122. 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001).
123. Id at 260.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 265.
126. Id. at 263 n.5 ("[Ilf proof of sex discrimination [i]s necessary, the evidence that
the victim's harassers sought to punish him for failing to live up to expected gender stereo-
types [is] sufficient to prove such discrimination.").
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harasser's conduct was motivated by a belief that the victim did not
conform to the stereotypes of his or her gender."127
In Doe v. City of Belleville,128 the Seventh Circuit likewise affirmed
this reading of the statute by ruling in favor of two plaintiffs who
claimed that they were repeatedly harassed for failing to act masculine
enough at work. According to the court, "H. Doe was harassed 'be-
cause of his gender ... [which] can be inferred from the harassers'
evident belief that in wearing an earring, H. Doe did not conform to
male standards." 129
Even the Ninth Circuit itself has stated that Title VII bars discrim-
ination based on gender non-conformity, holding that
"[d]iscrimination because one fails to act in the way expected of a
man or woman is forbidden under Title VII."1 30 Thus, both the Ninth
Circuit and other federal courts have consistently interpreted the Price
Waterhouse holding as expanding Title VII protections, and have there-
fore held that discrimination which is based on a person's failure to
conform to sex stereotypes violates the law.' 3 '
By refusing to wear makeup and openly declaring that wearing
makeup made her feel sick, Jespersen transgressed the boundaries of
traditional gender expectations. She did not behave in the way that
her employer expected a traditionally feminine woman to behave. Yet
the Ninth Circuit, directly contradicting its own earlier statement,13 2
ruled that Title VII did not protect Jespersen's gender non-
conformity.
IV. The Jespersen Holding Creates an Unfair Legal
Dichotomy in which Women in Typically Male
Industries Are Afforded More Protection than
Women in Typically Female Industries
The Jespersen holding creates a legal dichotomy under which some
employers can discriminate against women on the basis of sex stereo-
types. Because the Ninth Circuit held that the Price Waterhouse sex-ster-
eotyping rule did not apply to the grooming and appearance
127. Id. at 262-63.
128. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
129. Id. at 575.
130. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000).
131. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at 575, 580, 581.
132. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
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standards in Jespersen, s women in industries which typically employ
women may be left vulnerable to being fired, harassed, and discrimi-
nated against because they fail to conform to traditional appearance-
based standards for women. Since women in typically female jobs tend
to face more appearance regulations than do women in typically male
jobs, those in typically female jobs will be left with a lesser degree of
protection against sex stereotyping.
A. Women in Typically Female Jobs Are Subject to Heightened
Appearance-Based Regulations
Although the labor market is no longer as rigidly sex-segregated
as it once was,' 34 particular occupations continue to be associated with
either men or women.' 3 5 Certain jobs have traditionally been held by
women, and continue to be typically female jobs, such as cocktail wait-
resses, hostesses, secretaries, nurses, school teachers, and beauty salon
employees. 136 Most, though not all, of these jobs tend to be ones in
133. Jespersen Ill, 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) ("There is no evidence in this
record to indicate that the policy was adopted to make women bartenders conform to a
commonly-accepted stereotypical image of what women should wear.").
134. See Thomas L. Ruble et al., Sex Stereotypes: Occupational Barriers for Women, 27 AM.
BEtAV. SCIENriST 339, 339 (1984) ("[Cihanging patterns of employment reflect the height-
ened occupational aspirations of women [;] ... more women are attending college, includ-
ing professional schools such as medicine, law, and business."); Louis Uchitelle, Gaining
Ground on the Wage Front, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2004, at Cl, C2 (noting that the percentage
of women in executive, administrative, and managerial occupations has grown from 32%
in 1983, to 40% in 1990, to more than 46% today).
135. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 86 (listing secretaries/administrative assistants,
registered nurses, cashiers, and school teachers as the top four occupations in which wo-
men are currently employed); William T. Bielby & James N. Baron, Men and Women at
Work: Sex Segregation and Statistical Discrimination, 91 AM. J. SOCIOLoGy 759, 760 (1986)
("[T]he level of occupational sex segregation has changed very little since 1900, ... [and]
the occupational structure is divided substantially along gender lines."); Nancy F. Rytina &
Suzanne M. Bianchi, Occupational Reclassification and Changes in Distribution by Gender, 107
MoNTHLY LAB. REv. 11, 11 (1984) ("It is well known that women are concentrated in differ-
ent occupations than men."); see also Uchitelle, supra note 134 (noting that for some ex-
perts, "the spectacle of women gaining ground in harder times is vivid evidence that most
occupations are still largely segregated by sex and that men's occupations, while often
higher paying, are also more vulnerable to business cycles").
136. According to the United States Department of Labor, secretaries, waitresses, hair
dressers, sales workers, receptionists, cashiers, and customer service representatives all
numbered among the top twenty occupations in which women were most strongly repre-
sented. U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 86; see also Sylvia Nasar, Women's Progress StalledJust
Not So, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, § 3, 1 (acknowledging that occupations such as manage-
ment, medicine, law enforcement, and construction are traditionally "male-dominated pro-
fessions" while service sector occupations, such as clerking, nursing, and retail sales "still
employ the overwhelming majority of women"); Thomas L. Ruble et al., supra note 134, at
341-42 ("A sex typed occupation is one typically identified with one sex. For example,
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which appearance is perceived as being just as, or even more, impor-
tant than skills and capability. 137 Physical appearance and grooming
are more highly regulated and highly valued in these jobs.13 8 As one
scholar notes, "requiring women to wear sexually provocative clothing
easily may subject them to verbal or sexual harassment, yet it remains
a common practice in many bars and restaurants." 3 9 A well-groomed
and stereotypically-attractive woman is far more likely to be hired for,
and retained in, any of these positions than is a masculine-looking,
unkempt, or very overweight woman. 140 One way to understand this
phenomenon is the "sex role spillover" theory. 141 According to this
theory, women who work in typically female jobs will experience a
"spillover" in the form of a merger between their gendered sex roles
masculine occupations include auto mechanic, company president, and high government
official, while feminine occupations include nurse, elementary school teacher, and libra-
rian."); Francine Blau Weisskoff, "Women's Place" in the Labor Market, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 161,
163 (1972) ("[T]raditionally female jobs . . . [are found] in the clerical and service
category.").
137. See Daniel S. Hamermesh & Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty and the Labor Market, 84 AM.
ECON. REV. 1174, 1177 (1994) (noting that being beautiful has been found to be an advan-
tage for women seeking clerical jobs, but not for women seeking managerial and profes-
sional jobs); Ruble et al., supra note 134, at 343 ("[Occupations with high pay, prestige,
and challenging work tend to be dominated by males and sex typed as men's work. If
women aspire to professions with high salaries and prestige, however, they are probably
violating normative occupational expectations.").
138. SeeJespersen III, 444 F.3d at 1113 (holding against a plaintiff-bartender who chal-
lenged her employer's policy of requiring female employees to wear makeup); Gerdom v.
Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding for plaintiffs-flight attendants
who challenged their employer's policy of requiring only female flight attendants to meet
strict weight requirements); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Chi., 604 F.2d
1028 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding for a plaintiff-bank teller who challenged her employer's
dress code for women); Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973) (hold-
ing for plaintiffs-flight attendants who challenged their employer's rule allowing male
flight attendants to wear glasses, but requiring female flight attendants to wear contact
lenses); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1791,
1981 WL 40388 (E.E.O.C. 1981) (holding for a plaintiff-receptionist who brought suit
against her employer for requiring her to wear revealing clothing). The prevalence of ap-
pearance and grooming codes within particular industries and jobs, such as airline steward-
esses, restaurant and hospitality workers, and clerical workers indicates that these jobs,
which tend to require less formal education or skills, are also jobs in which appearance is
more highly regulated.
139. Stacey S. Baron, Note, (Un)Lawfully Beautiful: The Legal (De)Construction of Female
Beauty, 46 B.C. L. REv. 359, 371 (2005).
140. See, e.g., Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575 (Ct. App. 2003)
(holding in favor of a plaintiff who brought a discrimination suit claiming that her em-
ployer had ordered her to fire a retail saleswoman for being insufficiently sexually
attractive).
141. Barbara A. Gutek & Aaron Groff Cohen, Sex Ratios, Sex Role Spillover, and Sex at
Work: A Comparison of Men's and Women's Experiences, 40 HUM. RELAT. 97, 97 (1987).
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and work roles. 1 42 In other words, where the job is a typically female
occupation, unspoken expectations of femininity are built into the job
description. Employers looking to fill positions in typically female in-
dustries prefer to hire women who appear traditionally feminine and
attractive,1 43 because such appearances conform to traditional expec-
tations around femininity.
Jobs in female-dominated industries (or female-dominated sec-
tors of other industries), such as service and hospitality, 44 are gener-
ally considered less prestigious and less skilled than jobs in
traditionally male and professional industries, such as medicine, finan-
cial services, and law. The fact that many typically female jobs require
little formal education or training often translates into an employer
preference for attractive and "feminine" female employees. These jobs
are also the "ones which capitalise on the qualities and capabilities a
woman has by virtue of having lived" her life as a woman, 145 and thus
emphasize traditionally feminine traits, such as beauty, over other
qualities. One study of sexual harassment in the service industry notes
that expectations of beauty and "sexiness" for women in service work
has become the cultural norm. 146 The study observes:
In customer contact jobs, women's appearance is typically of great
importance. Strictly enforced dress and grooming codes are found
in all kinds of service operations, particularly evident in airlines,
hotels, restaurants, banks, health services, and personal care ser-
vices; and "attractiveness" is always at the core of these codes.
There is also a certain acceptance of peculiarly "liberal" dress-
codes in parts of the service industries. Topless serving and bikini
carwashing are regarded as tasteless rather than ridiculous,
whereas the mere suggestion of half-naked electricians or engi-
neers would prompt great guffaws. In the same vein, service adver-
tisements regularly display unbuttoned, invariably beautiful and
smiling women, not infrequently headed with slogans like "Spend
the night with me" (used by American Airlines in 1976) or "Plane-
mate of the month."1 4 7
Thus, a woman working as a restaurant hostess will almost always
be subject to much more specific requirements around dress, groom-
142. Id.
143. Ingebjorg S. Folgero & Ingrid H. Fjeldstad, On Duty - Off Guard: Cultural Norms
and Sexual Harassment in Service Organizations, 16 ORG. STUDIES 299, 303 (1995).
144. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 86 (showing that as of 2006, 71.5% of waiters
and waitresses are women).
145. Celia Davies & Jane Rosser, Gendered Jobs in the Health Service: A Problem for Labour
Process Analysis, in GENDER AND THE LABOUR PROCESS 103 (David Knights & Hugh Wilmott
eds., 1986).
146. See Folgero & Fjeldstad, supra note 143, at 303.
147. Id.
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ing, and physical attractiveness than will a woman working as a finan-
cial analyst.' 48 While the analyst may be required to wear suits or
otherwise maintain a "professional" look, she is unlikely to be rejected
for employment because she does not style her hair, is overweight, or
is considered conventionally unattractive. A financial analyst, further-
more, is unlikely to be hired purely on the basis of her looks, while a
restaurant hostess is.149
This emphasis on appearance as a substitute for skills and train-
ing within typically female jobs reinforces the notion that women are
valued for their beauty rather than for their intellect or skills. As one
scholar points out, "when employers set standards of attractiveness for
female employees, they can perpetuate a normative culture that values
a particularized form of female physical beauty and sex appeal over
female intellectual and practical skills." 150
One striking example of this is the recent Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA,
Inc.151 case. In Yanowitz, a regional sales manager for L'Oreal (a cos-
metics and perfume company) was forced to leave her job after she
refused to dismiss a female sales associate whom her male supervisor
deemed to be insufficiently sexually attractive, or "hot."152 Yanowitz's
supervisor told her to terminate the aforementioned sales associate
and ordered her to replace the associate with a woman who was "a
young attractive blonde girl, very sexy." 153 While Yanowitz ended up
prevailing against attempts to block her suit for unlawful retalia-
tion, 154 the case presents a striking example of the way in which wo-
men in typically female jobs (such as cosmetics sales) are often
148. This conclusion is echoed by other studies, one of which states:
Many of the women in the study [which looks at women working in restaurants]
indicated women's bodies and appearance were of the utmost importance in be-
ing hired and working in the restaurant industry. Interestingly, women often
cited that this was no coincidence on the part of restaurant owners and managers
who strategically desired to hire front of the house (FOH) staff (those who deal
directly with customers such as hostesses, servers, bartenders, and managers) who
were thin, attractive, young, outgoing, and mostly white.
Danielle Dirks, "It Comes with the Territory": Women Restaurant Workers' Experiences of
Sexual Harassment and Sexual Objectification 27 (2004) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Univer-
sity of Florida), available at http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0004961/dirks.d.pdf.
149. While it is arguable that the average person walking off the street with no previous
experience could more easily learn how to perform as a restaurant hostess than as a finan-
cial analyst, both positions require a particular skill set and a degree of experience which
the average person does not have.
150. Baron, supra note 139, at 383.
151. 116 P.3d 1123 (Cal. 2005).
152. Id. at 1125.
153. Id. at 1127-28.
154. Id. at 1129-30.
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evaluated on the basis of their physical beauty rather than their expe-
rience and skills.
In contrast, traditionally male-dominated, professionzl industries
tend to emphasize appearance less than they do professional training
and skills. Women who are not stereotypically beautiful or feminine
are less subject to regulation and censure if they are doctors than if
they are airline stewardesses, retail salespeople, or beauty salon em-
ployees. To the extent that female professionals, who by definition are
working in more traditionally male industries, are subject to such regu-
lation and censure, they will have an easier time invoking the protec-
tion granted by Price Waterhouse since the facts in their cases are likely
to be more analogous to the facts in Price Waterhouse.
B. Women in Typically Female Jobs Are Left with Diminished
Legal Protection Under the Jespersen Ruling
In ruling as it did, the Ninth Circuit created a sweeping norma-
tive exception to the Price Waterhouse rule by dramatically narrowing its
applicability to sex stereotyping. Reading between the lines, the Ninth
Circuit's opinion suggests that women in the service industry, and
other industries where appearance is highly regulated, should in fact
conform to traditional appearance-based sex-stereotypes since such
conformance is simply a part of the job. This result is at odds with
both the Price Waterhouse holding, 155 and the purpose of Title VII. 1 56
As an accountant in a professional firm, Ann Hopkins (the plain-
tiff in Price Waterhouse) was granted Title VII protection by the Su-
preme Court when it held that it was illegal for her firm to deny her
partner status, either in part or in whole, because she was not "femi-
nine" enough in her appearance and demeanor.1 57 As a bartender in
a casino, Darlene Jespersen was denied protection because she failed
to wear the full face of makeup required by her employer. 158 The
Ninth Circuit held that the makeup requirement was not based on the
desire to ensure that female employees conformed to "a commonly-
155. The Supreme Court's declaration that "we are beyond the day when an employer
could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associ-
ated with their group" was not followed by a qualification that limited this holding to em-
ployers in particular industries. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
156. See L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 735 U.S. 702, 708 n.13 (1978) ("[In
passing Title VII and] forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes." (citations omitted)).
157. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228.
158. Jespersen III, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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accepted stereotypical image of what women should wear,"15 but
rather that the policy simply reflected a reasonable expectation as to
how women in a service-industry context should look.1
60
Allowing appearance and grooming standards to slip past Title
VII's prohibition on sex stereotyping leaves women in typically femi-
nine industries less protected than those in more typically masculine
and professional industries. The outcome in Jespersen contradicts both
the letter and the spirit of Title VII, which was not enacted with the
intent of granting greater or lesser protection against sex-based dis-
crimination to plaintiffs according to the type of employment the
plaintiff holds.
C. The Impact of Jespersen on Future Grooming and Appearance
Cases
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Jespersen essentially closed the
door to bringing a successful sex-stereotyping claim in a grooming
and appearance policy case. By focusing on the factual differences be-
tween Jespersen and Price Waterhouse, the court avoided examining both
the substance and the effect of Harrah's grooming and appearance
policy. The court's opinion ignored the stereotypical nature of the
policy itself, and instead focused on how closely the facts in Jespersen
mirrored, or did not mirror, those in Price Waterhouse.16' In the end, by
ruling against Jespersen and for Harrah's, the Ninth Circuit granted
their judicial stamp of approval to a grooming and appearance policy
based on outdated sex stereotypes. 162
The Jespersen ruling effectively removes any bite that the sex-stere-
otyping test may have had within the context of appearance and
grooming policies. Future challenges to grooming and appearance
codes will thus likely be evaluated according to the alternative method
for proving sex discrimination: the unequal burdens test. As discussed
above, however, the unequal burdens test is not only difficult to meet,
but also depends largely on the subjective standpoint of the judges
who are applying it. Although Jespersen is still a recent case, it is not too
159. Id. at 1112.
160. See id. at 1113 ("This record.., is devoid of any basis for permitting this particular
claim to go forward, as it is limited to the subjective reaction of a single employee, and
there is no evidence of a stereotypical motivation on the part of the employer .... [11n
commenting on grooming standards, the touch-stone is reasonableness.").
161. See id. at 1111-12.
162. See id at 1113.
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soon to predict that it will have a large impact on future grooming
and appearance cases. 163
V. Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Jespersen creates a hierarchy of pro-
tection in which women in typically male industries will enjoy greater
protection against discrimination based on sex stereotyping than
those women who work in typically female industries. This is because
women in typically female industries and job sectors are generally
more subject to grooming- and appearance-based regulation than are
women in typically male jobs. The court's refusal to evaluate sex-spe-
cific grooming- and appearance-based regulations within the same
framework as other forms of sex discrimination creates a two-tier sys-
tem in which women in typically male jobs will enjoy more protection
against sex discrimination under Title VII.
The Ninth Circuit should have followed the lead of other circuits,
most notably the Sixth Circuit, and held that all discrimination based
on sex stereotyping, including an employee's refusal to conform to a
gender-specific grooming code, constitutes illegal discrimination
under Title Vii.164 While employers should be allowed to impose a
degree of regulation regarding grooming and appearance standards,
those codes which clearly rely on traditional sex-specific expectations
to impose differing requirements on men and women should not be
permitted under Title VII. Requiring employees to present a neat,
well-groomed appearance (such as requiring hair to be brushed, nails
to be trimmed, and clothing to be ironed), or requiring a particular
uniform for all employees, is not a form of sex stereotyping, and
therefore does not constitute intentional discrimination because of
sex. Other gender specific requirements which do not rely on tradi-
tional gender norms, such as requiring black uniforms for men and
white ones for women, are also permissible under Title VII.
Unless a gender-specific appearance or grooming requirement is
a BFOQ there is little need for appearance regulations which rely on
163. Jespersen has already been cited in one such case to support the holding that where
a "policy imposes requirements on both sexes and does not appear to impose unequal
burdens on its face . . . [the) dress code policy is not facially discriminatory." Rohaly v.
Rainbow Playground Depot, Inc., No. 56478-1-I, 2006 Wash. App. LEXIS 1917, at *17 (Ct.
App. Aug. 28, 2006).
164. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Bibby v. Phila. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
Winter 2008]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
traditional gender stereotypes. 165 Appearance and grooming stan-
dards which are based on stereotypical notions of how men and wo-
men should present themselves only reinforce these harmful
stereotypes. By applying the outdated unequal burdens test, the Ninth
Circuit backtracked on the Supreme Court's sex-stereotyping test and
turned its back on women in typically female jobs, leaving them with
substantially diminished protection against sex discrimination.
165. In certain professions, such as acting, gender obviously plays an important role in
the decision of who to hire, and therefore sex discrimination in this context is a legitimate
BFOQ.
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